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DEBATE 
PLAUSIBLE DENIAL:  SHOULD CONGRESS OVERRULE 
TWOMBLY AND IQBAL? 
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United 
States Supreme Court reinterpreted Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and announced a new standard by which pleadings 
for civil suits in federal district courts should be judged.  The Court 
explicitly rejected the notion expressed fifty years earlier in Conley v. 
Gibson that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a 
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief” and 
imposed a “plausibility” standard that every federal pleading must meet. 
In Plausible Denial, Mark Herrmann and James Beck debate with 
Professor Stephen Burbank whether this plausibility standard is a 
proper “recalibration” of the pleading rules or an illegitimate “innova-
tion” and whether Congress would be wise to overrule it.  In their 
Opening Statement, Herrmann and Beck argue that the drafters of 
the Federal Rules intentionally left Rule 8 ambiguous.  The creation 
of new federal rights, liberalization of class action rules, and massive 
escalation of discovery costs warranted the retirement of the “no set of 
facts” language from the Court’s earlier interpretation of Rule 8. In 
their view, the new course set by the Supreme Court is the proper one. 
In Rebuttal, Burbank asserts that the pleading standard imposed 
by Twombly and Iqbal finds no support in the views of the drafters of 
the Federal Rules.  Moreover, because it circumvented the rulemaking 
procedures established by the Rules Enabling Act, the Court was not 
well positioned institutionally to evaluate the procedural costs and 
benefits of the new plausibility standard.  Legislation to restore the 
status quo, he argues, is necessary to provide sufficient time to consid-
er change in a thoughtful and deliberate way through the democratic 
processes of rulemaking and legislation. 
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OPENING STATEMENT 
Pleading Standards After Iqbal 
Mark Herrmann† & James M. Beck†† 
The Supreme Court recently clarified the standards for courts to 
assess complaints upon motions to dismiss.  The Court recalibrated a 
pendulum that has been swinging for 100 years—and the new course 
is the proper one.  The Supreme Court got this one right, and Con-
gress should not trump the Court’s decision. 
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938, 
they changed existing rules for pleading claims.  Beginning in 1915, 
the Federal Rules of Equity had required a complaint to give “a short 
and simple statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff 
asks relief.”  FED. R. EQ. 25 (1912) (repealed 1937), reprinted in JAMES 
LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 158 (1912).  So-
called “Code pleading,” adopted in many states, required only a 
“statement of facts” to support a plaintiff’s claim. 
These standards gave rise to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 in 
1938.  The Federal Rules unified law and equity.  They also removed 
distinctions between “evidentiary” facts, “ultimate” facts, and “legal 
conclusions” in complaints.  New Rule 8(a)(2) required plaintiffs to 
provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).  It still does. 
But what does that mean?  Are those words inconsistent with the 
holdings in Twombly and Iqbal that Rule 8 requires sufficient factual 
allegations that, if accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face”?  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 
The obvious answer is “no.”  Rule 8 was intentionally ambiguous.  
The primary draftsman of the 1938 Rules, Charles Clark, explained 
that “we made a generalized statement in the rules” and “to one 
judge” a short and plain statement of the claim “may require much 
more than it does to others.”  AM. BAR ASS’N, RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
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DURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 220 (William 
W. Dawson ed. 1938).  That generalized statement worked as ex-
pected.  Some courts required more detailed pleadings than others.  
Compare, e.g., Patten v. Dennis, 134 F.2d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1943) (hold-
ing that Rule 8 requires “a statement of facts showing (1) the jurisdic-
tion of the court; (2) ownership of a right by plaintiff; (3) violation of 
that right by defendant; [and] (4) injury resulting to plaintiff by such 
violation”), with Chicago & Nw. Ry. v. First Nat’l Bank of Waukegan, 200 
F.2d 383, 384 (7th Cir. 1952) (employing language later used in Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 
In 1955, the Advisory Committee rejected an amendment to Rule 
8(a)(2) that would have required plaintiffs to state “facts constituting 
a cause of action.”  See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and 
the Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 893 n.109 (2009).  It 
did so not to endorse fact-free pleading, but rather because the 
Committee already viewed existing Rule 8(a)(2) as requiring “the 
pleader to disclose adequate information as the basis of his claim for 
relief as distinguished from a bare averment that he wants relief and is 
entitled to it.”  ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, RE-
PORT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 18-19 (1955), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/CV10-1955.pdf. 
In 1957, the Supreme Court weighed in, offering in Conley v. Gib-
son, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), an extremely liberal interpretation of Rule 8.  
Conley contained dictum that a complaint should not be dismissed 
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of 
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”  Id. at 
45-46.  This phrasing invited abuse, since hypothetical “set[s] of facts” 
not even pleaded could prevent dismissal.  Taken literally, the Conley 
dictum could make it impossible for a defendant to win a motion to 
dismiss, thus rendering Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 a nullity. 
Some courts declined to read Conley literally and continued to 
hold “that legal conclusions need not be accepted as true on 12(b)(6) 
motions” and “that pleaders are not entitled to unreasonable factual 
inferences.”  Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 16), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1452875.  They continued to dismiss complaints that plainly 
lacked merit. 
Meanwhile, times continued to change.  After 1957, Congress 
created many new statutory rights, see, e.g, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006)); 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 
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81 Stat. 602 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 621–34 (2006)), and the Supreme 
Court recognized others of constitutional dimension, see, e.g., Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971).  The Federal Rules also evolved.  In 1966, Rule 23 was libera-
lized, hugely expanding class action litigation.  See, e.g., 1 ALBE CONTE 
& HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (4th ed. 
2002) (documenting the “explosion” in mass tort and class action liti-
gation in last two decades).  In 1970, “substantial changes” were made 
to the discovery rules that broadened discovery beyond anything that 
existed when Conley was decided—e.g., the “good cause” prerequisite 
to document production was eliminated.  See Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 487 
(1970).  The Conley Court could not have foreseen these changes nor 
possibly have contemplated electronic discovery and its deployment as 
a weapon of mass expense.  See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDO-
NA PRINCIPLES:  BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR 
ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 17 (2d ed. 2007) 
(stating that unrestrained “transaction costs due to electronic discov-
ery will overwhelm the ability to resolve disputes fairly in litigation”). 
An example from our own prior litigation experience is illustra-
tive.  In the 1990s, companies in the orthopedic bone-screw industry 
competed fiercely in the marketplace and regularly took each other to 
court over intellectual property issues.  The industry’s products were 
used by physicians in standard-of-care spinal surgery. 
When organized plaintiffs chose to attack this industry (and its 
physician customers), they tried to undercut the existing standard of 
care for surgery.  They filed hundreds of complaints alleging:  (1) that 
the entire industry joined a conspiracy to defraud physicians and (2) 
that the industry, all of the leading medical societies, and certain phy-
sicians conspired to defraud other physicians, thus misleading the en-
tire medical profession. 
Confronted with one such complaint—naming more than 100 de-
fendants, including many individual physicians—Judge Milton Shadur 
dismissed it sua sponte.  Jarmasek v. AcroMed Corp., No. 95-7095, 1995 
WL 733466, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1995).  In his words, some allega-
tions would “seem very likely to be demonstrably false” and the inclu-
sion of certain defendants—“particularly, though not exclusively, the 
individual defendants”—“would seem highly problematic.”  Id. 
But another judge, overseeing multidistrict litigation, first permit-
ted the complaints to be amended and then allowed much of the 
amended complaints to survive motions to dismiss.  In re Orthopedic 
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Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1014, 1997 WL 186325, at *17 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997).  Although the manufacturers and medical 
societies (e.g., the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons) ar-
gued that physicians’ lectures at medical conferences constitute scien-
tific speech fully protected by the First Amendment, the court found 
them to be only “commercial speech” because plaintiffs “characterize 
the seminars as ‘Tupperware parties’ and ‘sales events.’”  Id. at *16. 
The ruling inflicted significant collateral damage.  Hundreds of 
pending lawsuits jeopardized some physicians’ credit and ability to ob-
tain mortgages.  One physician defendant died, and his widow and 
young children had to fight to obtain their inheritance out of probate.  
And, of course, all the defendants suffered the financial and practical 
burdens inflicted by massive discovery arising from these fanciful alle-
gations.  Needless to say, none of those complaints ever came close to 
trial, and they were eventually dismissed on summary judgment.  See 
James M. Beck & John A. Valentine, Challenging the Viability of FDCA-
Based Causes of Action in the Tort Context:  The Orthopedic Bone Screw Expe-
rience, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 389, 410-11 (2000).  But these allegations 
of nearly universal conspiracy—without any facts supporting the core 
conspiracy allegations—created millions of dollars of unnecessary  
legal expense. 
This type of out-of-control litigation prompted the Supreme Court 
in Twombly to adjust the threshold pleading requirements for unleash-
ing the legal process.  See 550 U.S. at 558 (“A district court must insist 
upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially mas-
sive factual controversy to proceed.” (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).  The Court reminded the judiciary that Rule 8(a) “requires a 
‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”  Id. 
at 555 n.3.  Under Twombly, a complaint must contain the following: 
 “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” id. at 555; 
 “[f]actual allegations . . . enough to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level,” id.; 
 “enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery 
will reveal evidence of [liability],” id. at 556; 
 “allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) 
[liability],” id. at 557; 
 “either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the ma-
terial elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable 
legal theory,” id. at 562 (internal quotation marks omitted); 
and 
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 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face,” id. at 570. 
The liberal Conley “no set of facts” dictum had “earned its retire-
ment” because too many courts had allowed “wholly conclusory state-
ment[s] of claim” to survive “whenever the pleadings left open the pos-
sibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] 
facts’ to support recovery.”  Id. at 561-63 (second alteration in original). 
Two years later, in Iqbal, the Court made clear that the adjusted 
pleadings standard applied to all complaints, not just to the antitrust 
claims involved in Twombly.  In any context, “conclusory” allegations 
are “disentitle[d] . . . to the presumption of truth.”  129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
We applaud this development. 
First, Twombly and Iqbal are proper exercises of judicial power.  
One of the Supreme Court’s jobs is to interpret the Federal Rules.  It 
is a reasonable choice to emphasize less that a complaint should be 
“short” and more that it must include a “showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). 
Second, Twombly and Iqbal are right on the law.  The rules should 
require “plausible” allegations.  Why should implausible litigation be 
allowed?  Likewise, claims should have to pass a “more than specula-
tive” test.  Anything less simply invites expensive fishing expeditions.  
As for “labels,” “conclusions,” and “formulaic recitations”—the better-
reasoned decisions did not credit them even under Conley.  The rules 
are not designed to reward lazy lawyers whose primary litigation tool is 
the word processor.  In short, there is nothing unreasonable about the 
pleading requirements that the Court articulated.  We should cele-
brate that the Supreme Court has settled on a standard that permits 
only “plausible,” non-“speculative” claims with a “reasonable expecta-
tion” of success to inflict on defendants the enormous cost of discov-
ery and the other collateral damages of litigation. 
Third, Twombly and Iqbal are the right policy.  All fair observers 
acknowledge the skyrocketing cost of discovery.  Some argue that the 
nature of the judicial process guarantees that judges cannot control 
discovery costs once litigation has commenced.  See, e.g., Frank H. Eas-
terbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638-39 (1989) (“A 
magistrate supervising discovery does not—cannot—know the ex-
pected productivity of a given request, because the nature of the re-
quester’s claim and the contents of the files (or head) of the adverse 
party are unknown.”).  Every incentive exists for plaintiffs to abuse 
discovery because many defendants choose settlement when faced 
with its high cost.  It is entirely proper to prevent plaintiffs who cannot 
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state even “plausible” claims from inflicting massive discovery costs on 
defendants—and on society. 
Fourth, courts have no legitimate basis for favoring plaintiffs when 
interpreting pleading standards.  A just system does not pick sides in 
advance, but instead establishes neutral rules.  We reject the norma-
tive view that it is somehow “better” to let unmeritorious cases proceed 
than to risk that meritorious cases will be dismissed.  Either way 
represents error, and neither error is inherently better than the other.  
Indeed, given the enormous transaction costs that litigation entails, 
Type II errors (false negatives) are probably preferable to Type I er-
rors (false positives) from a purely economic perspective. 
Finally, we are heartened by the recent statement of three justices: 
[T]here is considerable force to the argument that a hearing in which 
the trial court [imposes the cost of class notice on a defendant, but] does 
not consider the underlying merits of the class-action suit is not consis-
tent with due process because it is not sufficient, or appropriate, to pro-
tect the property interest at stake. 
DTD Enters., Inc. v. Wells, No. 08-1407, 2009 WL 3255157, at *1 (U.S. 
Oct. 13, 2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari).  The 
same reasoning equally applies to all litigation costs. 
Potentially meritorious claims by plaintiffs should not lightly be 
dismissed.  But implausible claims, unsupported by facts, should be 
screened out to avoid inflicting massive costs on innocent parties with 
essentially no procedural protection at all. 
Congress should endorse the recent decisions in Twombly and Iq-
bal; it should not undo them. 
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REBUTTAL 
Time Out* 
Stephen B. Burbank† 
The Supreme Court did not “clarify the standards for courts to as-
sess complaints upon motions to dismiss” in its recent pleading deci-
sions.  It changed them.  It did so, moreover, through a process that 
was illegitimate and inadequate given the statutory requirements of 
the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006), the stakes, and the 
Court’s woeful lack of both information and experience regarding the 
important issues of public policy implicated.  Those issues include, in 
addition to the costs of meritless litigation that Mr. Herrmann and 
Mr. Beck emphasize, access to court, the right to a jury trial, whether 
our society remains committed to private litigation as a means of se-
curing compensation for injury and enforcing important social norms, 
and whether, if we retreated from that commitment, we would provide 
alternatives. 
The drafters of the Federal Rules objected to fact pleading be-
cause it led to wasteful disputes about distinctions that they thought 
were arbitrary or metaphysical, too often cutting off adjudication on 
the merits.  As Edgar Tolman, who bore major responsibility for ex-
plaining the proposed Federal Rules to Congress, put it, “In these 
rules there is no requirement that the pleader must plead a technical-
ly perfect ‘cause of action’ or that he must allege ‘facts’ or ‘ultimate 
facts.’”  Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States:  
Hearings on H.R. 8892 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong. 
94 (1938) [hereinafter Hearings].  They also believed that pleading 
was a poor means to expose the facts underlying a legal dispute, a role 
that could better be played by discovery.  See id. at 98. 
Notice pleading was an important architectural element of a pri-
vate enforcement regime that was created by the federal judiciary pur-
suant to congressional delegation.  Once entrenched through Conley 
v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), it became part of the background 
against which Congress legislated, creating many of the new statutory 
rights mentioned by Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck.  What they do not 
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mention is the significance that Congress may have accorded notice 
pleading—and the easy access it affords—when enacting statutes with 
pro-plaintiff fee-shifting provisions or multiple damages provisions, 
which are clear signals of congressional purpose to use private civil lit-
igation as a means of enforcement. 
The attempt to defend Twombly from criticism by arguing that one 
judicial interpretation merely replaced another is not persuasive.  
First, it is difficult to find Twombly’s (let alone Iqbal ’s) standards in the 
relevant work of Charles Clark, the chief architect of the pleading 
rules, and it is difficult to separate his views from those of the Advisory 
Committee on which he served as Reporter.  Second, as Tolman testi-
fied, the original Advisory Committee found “thousands of cases that 
have gone wrong on dialectical, psychological and technical argument 
as to whether . . . certain allegations were allegations of ‘fact’ or were 
‘conclusions of law.’”  Hearings, supra, at 94.  Third, a generally appli-
cable requirement of “plausibility” is unquestionably an innovation.  
Fourth, the Court has told us that “we are bound to follow [a Federal 
Rule] as we understood it upon its adoption, and . . . we are not free 
to alter it except through the process prescribed by Congress in the 
Rules Enabling Act.”  Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 861 
(1999).  Clark’s pertinent statements about Rules 8 and 12 aside, if 
one insists on better evidence of the Court’s original understanding 
than Conley, there are (1) Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) 
(“The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of . . . no-
tice-giving . . . .”); (2) Tolman’s 1938 testimony to Congress; and (3) ex-
planations of the new Federal Rules by members of the Advisory Commit-
tee at educational events that were held for the practicing bar in 1938.  
See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:  PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. AND OF THE SYMPO-
SIUM AT NEW YORK CITY 241, 308 (Edward H. Hammond ed., 1938). 
Comparing the role that the drafters of the Federal Rules envi-
sioned for pleading, and what they thought could fairly be demanded 
of plaintiffs filing complaints, with the new world celebrated by Mr. 
Herrmann and Mr. Beck leaves no doubt that the Court in Twombly 
and Iqbal ignored previous acknowledgments that it has “no power to 
rewrite the Rules by judicial interpretation.”  Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 
286, 298 (1969).  Nor should there be any mystery why the Court pro-
ceeded as it did. 
Notwithstanding the Court’s embrace of notice pleading in Hick-
man and Conley, some lower federal courts determined that certain 
types of cases should be subject to heightened pleading requirements.  
In two decisions that Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck do not mention, 
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the Supreme Court rejected such judge-made rules as inconsistent 
with the Federal Rules and with the principle that the Federal Rules 
can be changed only through the Enabling Act process or by statute.  
See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002); Leatherman v. 
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 
168 (1993).  Yet, the technique persisted even after Swierkiewicz, and by 
this time it bordered on lawlessness. 
During the same period efforts were made again (as they were 
prior to Conley) to secure amendments to the Federal Rules that would 
implement some form of fact pleading.  Because such amendments 
would obviously and directly implicate access to court and the en-
forcement of substantive rights and rulemaking in the area would at-
tract intense interest group activity (on both sides) and lead to intense 
controversy in Congress, the Advisory Committee (on a number of oc-
casions) quickly determined not to proceed.  See, e.g., Civil Rules Advi-
sory Comm., Minutes:  September 7-8, 2006, at 22-24, http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV09-2006-min.pdf; id. at 22 (“There 
is no current disposition to recommend that notice pleading be aban-
doned or somehow redefined or tightened.”).  The Chief Justice, who 
appoints all members of rulemaking committees and meets regularly 
with key participants, was almost surely aware of this history.  Thus, 
when the Court (whose membership had changed since 2002) deter-
mined to make the break from notice pleading, the Article III process 
may have seemed all that was available. 
In initiating change through its power to decide cases and contro-
versies, however, the Court lacked the information and diverse pers-
pectives that the rulemaking process affords.  As a result, the Court 
was not well positioned institutionally to evaluate the procedural costs 
and benefits of tightening the pleading screws on plaintiffs in the iso-
lated substantive law contexts involved in those cases.  Acting under 
Article III, it was even less well positioned to estimate the procedural 
costs and benefits of a general rule of plausible pleading, let alone the 
broader social costs and benefits of such a rule. 
Numerous policy questions presented by Twombly and Iqbal would 
have benefited from the fruits of empirical research.  Consider as an 
example the Twombly Court’s discussion of the costs of discovery.  
Eschewing any reference to systematic as opposed to anecdotal data, 
the majority relied to a great extent on an article by Judge Easter-
brook that is heavy on theory and light on facts.  Bell Atl. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (citing Frank Easterbrook, Discovery 
as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635 (1989)).  Not only was that article’s analy-
2009] Plausible Denial 151 
sis predicated on a law and economics model of  “impositional discov-
ery,” it was published in 1989, before substantial changes to the dis-
covery rules in 1993, 2000, and 2006 that the Twombly Court did not 
mention.  Moreover, empirical research aside, many of the policy 
questions implicated in Twombly and Iqbal would have benefited from 
a base of experience with federal trial court litigation broader than 
that possessed by the members of the Supreme Court, almost all of 
which predated Justice Stevens’s appointment in 1975. 
Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck evidently have more federal litiga-
tion experience than the members of the Court.  Unfortunately, how-
ever, (1) they use it as an excuse to pad their Opening Statement with 
anecdotes said to be representative of the “type of out-of-control litiga-
tion [that] prompted . . . Twombly,” and (2) they show no more inter-
est in systematic data than did the Court in Twombly.  Indeed, remark-
ably, they claim that “[a]ll fair observers acknowledge the skyrocketing 
cost of discovery.”  In fact, empirical research on discovery conducted 
over thirty years has not demonstrated that it has been a problem in 
more than a small slice of litigation.  Moreover, an October 2009 Fed-
eral Judicial Center survey of attorneys in recently closed civil cases 
hardly supports the story of ubiquitous abuse or “skyrocketing cost.”  
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER NA-
TIONAL, CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 40 (2009), available at http:// 
www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf 
(finding that median estimates of discovery costs related to total litiga-
tion costs were lower than the median responses to the question of what 
the proper ratio is between the costs of discovery and litigation costs).  
At least, however, Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck’s Opening Statement 
confirms that the heart of the matter is discovery, not pleading. 
It has been said that although it may be easy to lie with statistics, it 
is easier to lie without them.  The process of adjudication permitted 
the Court to avoid some inconvenient truths that the Enabling Act 
process would have revealed and thereby to realign itself with business 
and business lawyers, just as Professor Robert Gordon predicted: 
Careful studies demonstrate that the “litigation explosion” and “liability 
crisis” are largely myths and that most lawyers’ efforts go into 
representing businesses, not individuals; unfortunately, those studies 
have had no restraining effect on this epidemic of lawyers’ open expres-
sion of disdain for law.  It may be, however, that business lawyers’ identi-
fication with law and the courts may rise again with the recent revival of 
business-friendly jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. 
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Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—A Brief Informal History of a 
Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1199 
(2009) (footnotes omitted). 
The Court did not know nearly enough to remake federal plead-
ing law through the process of adjudication, which is one reason why 
Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck’s blessing of the Court’s decisions can-
not be taken seriously.  At the end of the day, a normative assessment 
of these decisions and the problems that they address should depend 
on a careful identification and comparison of the costs and benefits of 
the litigation system to which notice pleading—accompanied by the 
opportunity for broad discovery—contributed and the proposed re-
placement, as well as consideration of alternative institutional avenues 
of change.  One need not reach the former steps, however, in order to 
conclude that Twombly and Iqbal were serious mistakes.  For, as I have 
demonstrated, there are many reasons to deplore the use of litigation as 
opposed to rulemaking or legislation as the vehicle for change, whether 
one is concerned about the process that should be used before important 
public policy decisions are made or about democratic accountability. 
Of course, no one knows nearly enough about the impact of 
Twombly and Iqbal to state with confidence that they have effected or 
will effect a radical change.  Yet, there already are many decisions re-
cognizing that complaints have been dismissed that would not have 
been dismissed previously and early empirical work suggests a dispro-
portionately adverse impact on the usual victims of “procedural” 
reform—civil rights, including employment discrimination, plaintiffs.  
See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?  Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. app. B (2009) (testi-
mony of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania 
Law School), http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-02-09%20Burbank 
%20Testimony.pdf (collecting cases); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of 
Pleading:  Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 33-39), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1487764.  Even apart from these concerns, howev-
er, Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck’s Opening Statement provides ample 
reason to conclude that the risks of harm should not be counte-
nanced while we wait for lawmaking that is legitimate and adequately 
informed.  Thus, their question, “Why should implausible litigation be 
allowed?,” and their assertion that “courts have no legitimate basis for 
favoring plaintiffs when interpreting pleading standards” both suggest 
lamentable indifference to the Seventh Amendment, which assigns to 
juries, not judges, the role of applying “experience and common 
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sense” to disputed facts.  There is a risk that judges assessing the plau-
sibility of complaints will fail to recognize the influence of their cul-
tural predispositions.  Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck’s Opening State-
ment is awash in cultural predispositions, some of which are at odds 
with foundational assumptions of the Federal Rules, numerous federal 
statutes that have sought to enlist them in the enterprise of private en-
forcement of public law, and the constitutionally ordained allocation 
of power between judge and jury. 
Because the Supreme Court’s recent pleading decisions are at 
odds with premises underlying the Federal Rules, with precedent, and 
with congressional expectations, and because those seeking access to 
the federal courts should not have to bear the risk of irreparable in-
jury as a result of improvident Supreme Court decisions, legislation to 
restore the status quo is necessary and appropriate.  Once such legisla-
tion is in place, it will be time to consider change in a thoughtful and 
deliberate way through the more democratic processes of rulemaking 
and legislation.  As suggested, the focus of the inquiry should be dis-
covery, not pleading. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
In Praise Of Twombly 
Mark Herrmann & James M. Beck 
We thank Professor Burbank for his thoughtful critique of our 
Opening Statement. 
Our overwhelming reaction to his critique is this:  we have heard 
these arguments before.  In the 1980s, the Supreme Court reinter-
preted Rule 56 to make obtaining summary judgment easier.  See, e.g., 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986).  Scholars attacked 
the Court for eschewing formal rulemaking and for violating the Se-
venth Amendment.  See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror:  The 
Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, 
and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 163-65, 181-87 (1988) 
(claiming that the summary judgment trilogy violates the Rules Enabl-
ing Act and is unconstitutional).  In the 1990s, the Court reinter-
preted Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to limit expert testimony.  See 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-95 (1993).  
Again, the academy was outraged for the same reasons.  See, e.g., Mi-
chael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner:  Triple Play or 
Double Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 760 (1998) (arguing that Daubert is 
unconstitutional).  Now, in the 2000s, the Court has reinterpreted 
Rule 8 to raise the pleading bar, and here we go again.  We are confi-
dent that, two decades hence, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 128 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), will be as ac-
cepted a part of the legal landscape as Catrett and Daubert are today. 
We also have specific reactions to Professor Burbank’s arguments, 
which we group into the following five general categories. 
First, Professor Burbank suggests that Twombly and Iqbal did not 
clarify but rather changed the law, perhaps dramatically enough to 
undercut Congress’s reliance on existing pleading standards when it 
enacted legislation in the 1960s and 1970s.  No legislative history is of-
fered, so the same speculation could apply to summary judgment or 
expert witness standards—Congress “may have” relied on them in its 
legislative process.  Yet Congress has never overruled Catrett or Daubert, 
and the Supreme Court still follows them. 
Twombly is no more “radical” than Catrett or Daubert.  Rule 8(a) in-
vites interpretation.  As explained in our Opening Statement, Charles 
Clark, the primary draftsman of the 1938 Rules, said so.  And the low-
er courts said so:  for twenty years, they divided over Rule 8’s meaning.  
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The 1957 Conley decision gave Rule 8 an extremely liberal interpreta-
tion, but even Conley did not end the ambiguity.  Federal judges con-
tinued to adjust pleading standards in various types of cases, see, e.g., 
Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985), and the Supreme 
Court responded as it saw fit.  The Court sometimes rejected more 
stringent pleading requirements, see, e.g., Leatherman v. Tarrant County 
Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), and 
sometimes accepted them, see e.g., Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 
U.S. 336, 347 (2005).  Twombly and Iqbal simply continue that conver-
sation.  The Republic has not fallen. 
Second, Professor Burbank implies that, in Twombly and Iqbal, the 
Supreme Court may have acted beyond its authority.  He claims that 
Twombly ignored earlier Court pronouncements that the Federal Rules 
can be “changed” only through the Rules Enabling Act process.  In-
deed, Professor Burbank accuses lower courts that interpret Rule 8 
more strictly as “border[ing] on lawlessness.”  By that standard, Erie 
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), must be outright 
anarchy—reinterpreting the Rules of Decision Act and a core proce-
dural doctrine far older than Conley with no Rules Committee or “em-
pirical research” at all. 
Moreover, Twombly was decided by a seven-to-two majority in the 
Supreme Court.  If stricter pleading standards are “lawlessness,” our 
highest court has not gotten the memo.  Rule 1 directs courts to in-
terpret the Rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action.”  FED R. CIV. P. 1.  The Supreme Court was 
well within that mandate to interpret Rule 8 to require a “plausible” 
claim before a plaintiff can unleash discovery on an opponent.  In-
deed, many (although not all) scholars recognize a more expansive 
Supreme Court role in interpreting the Federal Rules than when in-
terpreting a statute.  See, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone:  An Un-
Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court’s Role as Interpreter of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720, 720 (1988).  
Twombly and Iqbal fall comfortably within the Court’s authority. 
The Supreme Court, of course, knows all about its earlier prece-
dents and the Rules Enabling Act.  Twombly discussed and distin-
guished Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), its most re-
cent pleading decision.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70.  The distinction 
may or may not be persuasive, but the question presented in Swierkie-
wicz did not concern notice pleading but whether a discrimination 
plaintiff must “plead specific facts showing that at trial he can make 
out a prima facie case of discrimination.”  Edward A. Hartnett, Taming 
Twombly, 158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 37 
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n.114), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1452875.  The Court re-
jected that requirement, in part because the same prima facie re-
quirement “does not apply in every employment discrimination case.”  
Id.  Under the Twombly standard, the Swierkiewicz complaint probably 
stated a plausible employment discrimination claim:  It pleaded “the 
events leading to [the plaintiff’s] termination,” the “relevant dates,” 
and “the ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons 
involved,”  Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, and that the plaintiff was more 
qualified than the person who replaced him, id. at 508. 
Third, Professor Burbank next asserts—and this takes our breath 
away—that discovery costs have not skyrocketed in recent years. 
That position is belied by both common sense and experience and 
has little to support it.  The authority proffered, a recent article in the 
William & Mary Law Review, cites nothing—empirical or otherwise—to 
support its assertions.  And those assertions relate to numbers of law-
suits filed, not the amount of discovery taken.  The Court in Twombly 
and Iqbal was rightly concerned with abusive discovery, not mere 
numbers of suits.  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558-60.  
Nor does the 2009 Federal Judicial Center (FJC) survey lend much 
comfort to those who criticize Twombly.  For the cases included in the 
FJC’s sample, “the median cost, including attorney fees, was $15,000 
for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants.”  EMERY G. LEE III & THO-
MAS E. WILLGING, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER NATIONAL, CASE-BASED 
CIVIL RULES SURVEY 2 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ 
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf. 
Attorney fees of fifteen to twenty thousand dollars a case—start to 
finish?  There is not much need to worry about Twombly in those cases.  
Those price tags plainly do not reflect sophisticated motion practice.  
Twombly’s primary benefit will be in more complex cases, where the 
imperative to weed out implausible claims is stronger.  Moreover, even 
in the FJC’s sample, attorneys in approximately a quarter of the cases 
believed that discovery costs were disproportionate to the client’s 
stake.  LEE & WILLGING, supra, at 28.  Were one to focus on the sys-
tem’s problem children—class actions, mass torts, antitrust, and the 
like—we suspect that dissatisfaction would be far higher. 
Experience also belies Professor Burbank’s argument.  The elec-
tronic document depository in the Enron Securities Litigation, for ex-
ample, contained “over 20 million documents (not pages—full docu-
ments).”  DIANE M. SUMOSKI, ENRON:  NAVIGATING THE CIVIL SIDE OF 
THE CORPORATE CASE OF THE CENTURY 6 (2007), available at http:// 
www.ccsb.com/pdf/Publications/Business%20Litigation/Navigating_ 
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the_civil_side.pdf.  Although we have not researched it, we would 
wager a fair amount that all discovery in the entire federal court sys-
tem did not total twenty million documents in 1957 when Conley was 
decided.  There is a difference in kind between creating documents 
with manual typewriters and carbon paper and saving every iteration 
of every e-mail or spreadsheet found in the computers of a modern 
corporation.  Academics never hear e-discovery vendors report that 
merely preserving and gathering a corporation’s e-documents will cost 
three million dollars—before any privilege check or substantive review.  
We have heard those words personally and have read about other ex-
amples.  See, e.g., Jonathan L. Frank & Julie Bédard, Electronic Discovery 
in International Arbitration:  Where Neither the IBA Rules Nor U.S. Litigation 
Principles Are Enough, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2007–Jan. 2008, at 62, 73 n.1 
(giving several examples of multi-million dollar e-discovery bills); Pa-
trick L. Oot, The Protective Order Toolkit:  Protecting Privilege with Federal 
Rule of Evidence 502, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 237, 239 (2009) (describing 
one defendant that spent “$13.5 million reviewing and logging docu-
ments for relevancy and privilege in a single matter”). 
As a matter of theory, courts are institutionally incapable of con-
trolling discovery.  “Judicial officers cannot measure the costs and 
benefits to the requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted).  As a 
matter of practice, since broad discovery began, discovery rules have 
been amended repeatedly (Rule 26 in 1980, 1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, 
and 2006) without noticeable success.  Much time and effort have 
gone into “fixing” discovery, yet the consensus of the country’s best 
trial lawyers is that it has not worked: 
The discovery system is, in fact, broken.  Discovery costs far too much 
and has become an end in itself.  As one respondent noted: “The dis-
covery rules in particular are impractical in that they promote full dis-
covery as a value above almost everything else.”  Electronic discovery, in 
particular, clearly needs a serious overhaul.  It is described time and time 
again as a “morass.”  Concerning electronic discovery, one respondent 
stated, “The new rules are a nightmare.  The bigger the case, the more 
the abuse and the bigger the nightmare.” 
INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF 
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (2008), available at 
http://druganddevicelaw.net/ACTL_Discovery_Report.pdf. 
Ideally, we could fix discovery.  But that fix has eluded the best 
minds on the Rules Committee for well over a quarter century.  Since 
the pursuit of perfection had obstructed the accomplishment of any-
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thing good—or even attainable—for forty years, Twombly provided a 
good opportunity for the Court to try something else.  If litigation costs, 
especially discovery, are to be effectively constrained, those limits must 
come at the pleadings stage.  We have already tried everything else. 
Fourth, Professor Burbank accuses us of “lamentable indifference 
to the Seventh Amendment.”  But it does not offend the Constitution 
to weed out implausible claims before trial.  Summary judgment was 
upheld against a Seventh Amendment challenge ninety years ago in 
an opinion by Justice Brandeis.  See Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Eng’g Co., 243 
U.S. 273, 279 (1917).  Directed verdict survived a similar challenge, 
again well before we were born.  Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 
388-96 (1943).  There’s nothing new here. 
Thus, “many procedural devices developed since 1791 that have 
diminished the civil jury’s historic domain have been found not to be 
inconsistent with the Seventh Amendment.”  Parklane Hosiery Co. v. 
Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (discussing collateral estoppel).  “In 
numerous contexts, gatekeeping judicial determinations prevent 
submission of claims to a jury’s judgment without violating the Se-
venth Amendment.”  Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 
U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007) (referencing Daubert, judgment as a matter of 
law, and summary judgment).  Both courts and Congress have “power 
to prescribe what must be pleaded to state the claim.”  Id. (discussing 
specific pleading of fraud).  Historically, courts imposed pleading re-
quirements far more onerous than mere “plausibility”—“code” plead-
ing or worse—for 150 years before the Federal Rules were adopted.  
None violated the Seventh Amendment. 
Fifth, Professor Burbank exudes great concern for plaintiffs, his so-
called “victims.”  But what of defendants?  Why is it fair—or right as a 
matter of law, morality, or even “cultural predisposition”—to subject 
defendants to massive litigation and discovery costs on bare allega-
tions, when those allegations are not even “plausible”?  When courts 
fail to dismiss implausible complaints containing only “formulaic” and 
“speculative” allegations, defendants must spend money for no good 
reason; courts cannot focus on other, more legitimate cases; and so-
ciety ultimately suffers the loss of these wasted resources. 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Twombly and Iqbal simply 
extend a debate over pleading standards that began long before the 
enactment of the Federal Rules in 1938.  These decisions try to solve a 
problem—massively inflated discovery costs—that was not anticipated 
in 1938 (or 1957) and that has grown exponentially worse over time.  
Implausible litigation should not be allowed, period.  Modern discov-
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ery no longer allows us that luxury.  The Supreme Court has taken an 
intelligent step toward trying to solve this problem, and Congress 
should not stand in its way. 
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CLOSING STATEMENT 
Straws, Sand, and Sophistry* 
Stephen B. Burbank 
Lacking either a sound empirical or a sound normative basis for 
their position, Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck have resorted to the time-
honored, but epistemically thread-bare, techniques of setting up and 
knocking down strawmen, throwing sand in the air, and constructing 
arguments that, although superficially plausible (as it were), are re-
vealed as fallacious. 
Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck say that they have “heard these ar-
guments [regarding the illegitimacy and inadequacy of the process 
used by the Court] before.”  Even if that were true, they have not 
heard them from the scholar who wrote the definitive history of the 
Rules Enabling Act and who was the principal adviser to the House of 
Representatives in connection with the 1988 amendments to that sta-
tute.  Moreover, far from suggesting that the arguments lack merit, 
the phenomenon may reflect the fact that the Court, which (ironical-
ly) Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck say “knows all about . . . the Rules 
Enabling Act,” has been cavalier in its treatment of that statute, ignor-
ing its legislative history, its primary purpose of allocating prospective 
lawmaking power between the Court and Congress, and, most impor-
tant, its limitations on the Court’s own power.  See generally Stephen B. 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
But the arguments I have made against Twombly and Iqbal are not 
the same as those others have made against previous judicial interpre-
tations of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or Rule 56.  Unlike the 1938 
Federal Rules, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is a statute, rendering the 
Enabling Act irrelevant; I do not believe that Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), is unconstitutional, and I 
have not claimed that either Twombly or Iqbal is unconstitutional (al-
though the latter in particular is in tension with the Seventh Amend-
ment).  As for summary judgment, “[i]t is not . . . a reproach that fed-
eral judges have responded to the costs and demands of 
contemporary litigation by dusting off Rule 56 and trying to make it 
serve some semblance of its originally intended function of separating 
the wheat from the chaff.”  Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and 
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Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases:  Drifting Toward Bethlehem or 
Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 622-23 (2004).  As my Re-
buttal demonstrated, however, separating the wheat from the chaff 
was not the “originally intended function” of the pleading rules. 
Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck are making a political prediction ra-
ther than a reasoned argument, a view confirmed by their smug asser-
tion of confidence that “two decades hence, [Twombly and Iqbal] will 
be as accepted a part of the legal landscape as Catrett and Daubert are 
today.”  Unfortunately, even as political prediction, their Closing 
Statement is impoverished.  Witness their attempt to equate expert 
testimony with pleading rules among the background rules on which 
Congress may have relied when enacting statutes intended to be en-
forced through private civil litigation.  Of course, Congress could not 
have relied on a Supreme Court interpretation of Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 702 when “enact[ing] legislation in the 1960s and 1970s” be-
cause no such interpretation existed.  To be sure, given the interest of 
the business community in preserving the fruits of its recent Supreme 
Court victories and the influence of lobbyists in Congress, securing a 
return to the status quo will not be easy.  Let us not, however, confuse 
money with reason.  And I had thought that smugness in politics went 
out of fashion on January 20, 2009. 
Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck’s renewed attempt to normalize 
Twombly and Iqbal from an institutional perspective is as unconvincing 
as their first effort.  They pretend that “interpretation” is a process ca-
pacious enough to accommodate (1) the abandonment of the system 
of notice pleading that Clark intended, that Congress and the bar 
were told in 1938 had been implemented in the Federal Rules, and 
that the Supreme Court embraced as early as 1947; (2) its replace-
ment by a system of complaint-parsing that is hard to distinguish from 
that which the drafters of the Federal Rules explicitly rejected; and (3) 
a wholly new general requirement of “plausibility.”  As a realist, I un-
derstand that the difference between interpretation and judge-made 
law is one of degree rather than kind, but here the degrees of separa-
tion approach one hundred and eighty. 
Like law students misled by course materials that were designed to 
demonstrate how doctrine develops, Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck 
seem unaware of the significance of the fact that the only lower court 
decision they cite in aid of their normalization project, Elliott v. Perez, 
751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir. 1985), predated both Leatherman v. Tarrant 
County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993), 
and Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).  The “conversa-
tion” or “debate” they imagine between the Court and lower federal 
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courts was in fact akin to that between a parent and a serially wayward 
child.  In that regard, the (unanimous) Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005), did not “accept” a require-
ment of fact pleading that had been imposed by a lower federal court.  
It used the occasion of litigation governed by the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act to contextualize the requirement that a com-
plaint provide fair notice.  See id. at 346.  Dura may have facilitated 
part of the analysis in Twombly, but it is light years away from Iqbal. 
In any event, the difference between the Supreme Court overrul-
ing one of its previous decisions, as it did in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)—Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck’s example—
and the lower federal courts refusing to follow binding Supreme 
Court authority should be obvious.  The latter behavior may properly 
be characterized as “bordering on lawlessness,” as I did in my Rebut-
tal.  The former may properly be so characterized if the decision does 
not involve an interpretation of the Constitution and is inconsistent 
with a governing act of Congress such as, well, the Enabling Act.  Of 
course, Erie was about much more than the Rules of Decision Act or a 
“core procedural doctrine;” the Court insisted that the Constitution 
required the result.  See id. at 77-78.  Moreover, even if constitutional 
interpretation and procedural lawmaking required comparable resort 
to empirical data, the Erie Court was explicit and recent scholarship 
has demonstrated that the Court’s extensive and continuous expe-
rience with the system of corporate diversity litigation was a major un-
derlying cause of the decision in Erie.  See id. at 74 (“Experience in ap-
plying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, had revealed its defects, political 
and social . . . .”); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRES-
SIVE CONSTITUTION 141-64 (2000) (documenting the Erie-opinion au-
thor’s “deep resentment of large national corporations and the unfair 
advantages they reaped from Swift and diversity jurisdiction” and 
“acute concern with the proliferation of elaborate litigation tactics 
that complicated the law and wasted social resources, tactics that Swift 
and diversity encouraged”). 
Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck’s focus on the fact that “Twombly was 
decided by a seven-to-two majority” as evidence that “Twombly and Iq-
bal fall comfortably within the Court’s authority” provides one hint 
among many that their seemingly random citation practice—
sometimes of Twombly alone and sometimes of both Twombly and Iq-
bal—is strategic.  They do not address the fact that both Justice Souter, 
the author of Twombly, and Justice Breyer dissented in Iqbal.  Nor do 
they cite the preeminent work on the Court’s proper role in “inter-
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preting” the Federal Rules.  See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Del-
egation:  Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
1099 (2002).  As Professor Struve’s article demonstrates, only a law-
yer—and at that only a lawyer on a mission—could argue with a 
straight face that the Court’s recent pleading decisions did not 
“change a Rule.”  See id. at 1135-36.  Perhaps that is why, notwithstand-
ing the Swierkiewicz Court’s insistence that the Enabling Act process  is 
the only proper means for the judiciary to require fact pleading, 
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515, the Third Circuit has taken the view that 
“because Conley has been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and 
Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns pleading re-
quirements and relies on Conley.”  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 
203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).  At the end of the day, one can only wonder 
at the spectacle of Justices who deride a “living Constitution” enthu-
siastically embracing living Federal Rules.  From this perspective, the 
legislation I favor would bring back the “Federal Rules in Exile.” 
Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck could have spared themselves anoxia 
if they were interested in responding to, rather than distorting, what I 
said in my Rebuttal.  First, rather than “assert[ing] . . . that discovery 
costs have not skyrocketed in recent years” (the alleged assertion that 
“takes [their] breath away”),  I noted the absence of systematic empir-
ical evidence that discovery “has been a problem in more than a small 
slice of litigation.”  Second, Mr. Herrmann’s and Mr. Beck’s “common 
sense and experience” is no more reassuring as a substitute for empir-
ical data on discovery than is the Court’s resort to “judicial experience 
and common sense,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950, as a substitute for an 
evidentiary record when assessing whether a case should be allowed to 
proceed.  Third, in dismissing the significance of a recent Federal 
Judicial Center (FJC) survey that, as I noted in my Rebuttal, “hardly 
supports the story of ubiquitous abuse or ‘skyrocketing costs’” (and 
thus also hardly supports their “common sense and experience”), Mr. 
Herrmann and Mr. Beck again reveal their cultural predispositions.  In 
the process, they also nicely illustrate one of the dilemmas of transsubs-
tantive rules:  It may be that “Twombly’s primary benefit will be in more 
complex cases.”  Why, however, should the usual victims of “procedur-
al” reform—actual and putative civil rights, including employment dis-
crimination, plaintiffs—have to suffer its primary costs?  It may also be 
that “[t]he Republic has not fallen,” but the Court’s deplorable process 
illustrates how easy it is to claim a Republican form of government. 
The “experience” Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck cite consists of a 
few more anecdotes.  The Federal Rules were extensively amended in 
2006 to address the problems of electronic discovery.  I am unwilling 
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to conclude that those amendments have been unsuccessful merely 
on the say-so of those who have a large stake in portraying them as a 
failure or because of theoretical arguments that the Court also trotted 
out in Twombly and that predated those (and two other sets of discov-
ery) amendments.  How do Mr. Herrmann and Mr. Beck know that 
these recent discovery amendments have not had “noticeable suc-
cess”?  They do not know that, and neither do the rulemakers (partic-
ularly given the recent FJC survey).  This, of course, is another reason 
to bury rather than to praise Twombly and Iqbal and to return to the 
status quo ante until (1) systematically collected data and a broader 
base of experience replace self-serving horror stories by elite lawyers 
and clients as a basis for calculating the costs of notice pleading, (2) 
there has been adequate attention to the benefits of notice pleading, 
and (3) the costs and benefits of notice pleading are compared with 
the costs and benefits of the proposed replacement.  If the case for 
change can be made, the resulting rules amendments should attack 
the problem of discovery directly and in such a way as to minimize col-
lateral damage to those whose cases are not part of that problem. 
Finally, I harbor no doubt that this Court would reject a Seventh 
Amendment challenge to plausibility pleading.  That by no means les-
sens my concern, or the concern that members of Congress should 
have, about the tension that exists between the role of the jury that 
our founders intended and the role of a judge directed to assess the 
plausibility of a complaint according to “judicial experience and 
common sense” without the benefit of a factual record.  Fifty years ago 
between eleven and twelve percent of federal civil cases had a trial in 
open court.  In recent years, between one and two percent of federal 
civil cases have terminated at or after trial.  See Marc Galanter, The Va-
nishing Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 533 tbl.A-2 (2004).  This 
is a staggering reduction in trials in less than half a century.  I am con-
cerned that Twombly and Iqbal may contribute to the phenomenon of 
vanishing trials, the degradation of the Seventh Amendment right to a 
jury trial, and the emasculation of litigation as a means of enforcing 
civil law.  I am particularly concerned because in rendering these de-
cisions the Court evaded the statutorily mandated process that gives 
Congress the opportunity to review, and if necessary to block, pros-
pective procedural policy choices before they become effective.  Both 
the process used to reach these decisions and their foreseeable conse-
quences undermine democratic values. 
2009] Plausible Denial 165 
 
 
 
Preferred Citation:  Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck, & Stephen 
B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial:  Should Congress Overrule Twombly 
and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141 (2009), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf. 
